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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY/ ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent/ 
-vs- I 
BILLY E. NOON, 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
> BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 Docket No. 860493 
i Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion 
to dismiss for lack of probable cause to make an arrest? 
2. Was defendant denied a fair trial due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30/ 1985/ defendant was arrested for 
violation of §41-6-44/ Layton Municipal Code/ driving under 
the influence of alcohol. (R. 2/8; Addendum 1). An 
information was filed charging him with this offense, 
(Addendum 2) A one day jury trial was held on March 4/ 1986 
in the Fourth Circuit Court of Davis County/ Layton 
Department/ before the Honorable K. Roger Bean. (R. 3-5/ 
Tr. 1) The following facts were revealed at trial. 
The defendant drove his car into the parking lot of the 
Circle K at the corner of Main and Antelope Drive/ Layton/ at 
approximately 9 p.m. (Tr.22,50/145) A clerk at the Circle 
K/ Matt Wilhelm, saw defendant drive into the parking lot 
"pretty fast." (Tr. 22) Defendant parked his car and went 
into the store. (Tr. 23) Mr. Wilhelm testified that 
defendant was stumbling (Tr. 24)/ his speech was slurred and 
he spilled coffee from a cup he had obtained in the store. 
(Tr. 25) Wilhelm also claimed he smelled alcohol on his 
breath. (Tr. 25) When defendant left the store to turn off 
his car lights/ Wilhelm called the police. (Tr. 26) 
Defendant reeentered the store and the police arrived 
approximately five minutes after Wilhelm had called. (Tr. 
39) Defendant was still in the store when the police 
arrived. (Tr. 28) There was no testimony as to what 
defendant was doing during those five minutes. 
Once Wilhelm pointed the defendant out to the police/ 
Officer Robnett/ Layton City Police/ walked over to the 
defendant and asked him to blow into his hand. (Tr. 58) 
After defendant had complied/ Robnett asked him to step 
outside of the store and perform some field sobriety tests. 
(Tr. 58) Defendant performed the tests as requested by 
Robnett and was subsequently placed under arrest "for his own 
safety." (Tr. 63) 
Robnett asked defendant to repeat the field sobriety 
tests at the station. (Tr. 97-8/108) Robnett also testified 
that he requested the defendant perform a breathalyzer test 
at the police station. (Tr. 66) Defendant attempted to 
comply/ but the results were never obtained. (Tr. 152) 
Officer Robnett was allowed to testify without objection 
concerning defendant's supposed "refusal" to take the test. 
(Tr. 67-70) 
At the conclusion of the Statefs evidence/ defendant 
moved to dismiss on two grounds: (1) no proof of corpus 
delicti and (2) lack of probable cause to arrest for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. (Tr. 131) The motions were 
denied. (TR. 131) 
The jury found defendant guilty of driving while under 
the influence of alcohol/ a class B misdemeanor/ in violation 
of §41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code. (R. 25/ Tr. 188) At 
trial/ defendant was represented by attorney Christopher L. 
Shaw. (Tr. 3) After the jury verdict and prior to 
sentencing/ defendant discharged Mr. Shaw and retained 
present counsel to represent him in this matter. (R. 27-29) 
On March 26/ 1986/ defendant was sentenced to jail for 
180 days with 120 days suspended/ ordered to submit to 
assessment by and undergo a treatment program with the Utah 
Alcohol Foundation/ and ordered to pay fines and restitution 
totaling $408.00. (R. 30) On April 23/ 1986/ the trial 
judge denied defendant's motion for arrest of judgment and 
order of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial. 
(R. 31-2/ 41-2) Defendant appealed to the Second District 
Court/ Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding. Memoranda of 
points and authorities were filed by both parties. (R. 
52-61/ 63-74) After oral argument held on July 22/ 1986/ the 
District Court upheld the Circuit Court's verdict in a July 
25/ 1986 ruling. (R. 76-7) Defendant subsequently took an 
appeal to this Court. (R. 78-9) 
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Defendant's sentence has been stayed pending the outcome 
of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The arresting officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol 
since the officer never saw defendant drive/ there was no 
verification of the informant's testimony placing defendant 
in a vehicle and the informant did not testify concerning an 
erratic driving pattern by defendant. There was also a delay 
in time between when the informant claimed he saw defendant 
drive and when he was approached by the police. In addition/ 
the arresting officer was so unsure about defendant's 
condition that he asked defendant to perform additional field 
sobriety tests after he had been placed under arrest and 
taken to the police station. 
2. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
at trial since his attorney on several occasions during the 
state's case failed to interpose objections to testimony that 
should have been inadmissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The testimony was prejudicial to defendant and 
denied him a fair trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST TO ARREST DEFENDANT 
FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
A warrantless arrest is permitted for violation of 
§41-6-44, U.C.A. (1953/ as amended)/ as follows: 
§41-6-44 (8). A peace officer may/ without 
a warrant/ arrest a person for violation of this 
section when the officer has probable cause to 
believe the violation has occurred/ although not 
in his presence/ and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed 
by the person. 
Addendum 1. 
Probable cause is thus the standard by which the 
constitutionality of the police officerfs actions in 
questioning the defendant and subsequently arresting him is 
to be weighed. See Utah Constitution, Article 1/ Section 14; 
United States Constitution/ Fourth Amendment. Addendum 3. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "reasonable" or "probable" 
cause as follows: 
The determination should be made on an objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer/ 
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom/ a reasonable and prudent person in his 
position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect had committed the offense. 
State v. Hatcher/ 27 Utah 2d 318/ 495 P.2d 1259/ 1260 (1972), 
(fn. omitted). "This level of probability must exist at the 
actual moment of arrest/.../ and must be based on known 
facts/...." People v. Severson/ 561 P.2d 373/ 375 (Colo. 
App. 1977) (citations omitted). 
Based on the facts personally known to the officer/ he 
did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving 
under the influence. "Probable cause may rest on reasonably 
trustworthy information from an informant. However/ some of 
the details of the information given by the informant must be 
verified before an arrest." Pistro v. State/ 590 P.2d 884/ 
886 (Alaska/ 1979) (emphasis added) (fn. omitted). See also 
People v. Ramey/ 16 Cal.3d 263/ 127 Cal. Rptr. 629/ 545 P.2d 
1333/ 1336 (1976). Here/ there was no such verification as 
to whether defendant had actually been driving an ciutomobile 
sometime prior to Officer Robnett's encounter with him in the 
Circle K. Defendant made no admission of either drinking or 
ownership of an automobile at any time/ whether prior to or 
after his arrest. (Tr. 65-7) 
The arresting police officer never saw the defendant 
driving so had no opportunity to observe whether his driving 
pattern was normal or not. The only data available to the 
officer at the time of the arrest which linked defendant to 
the car was the statement of Matt Wilhelm. (Tr. 56) There 
was no testimony which led conclusively to the inference that 
defendant was intoxicated while driving. 
Defendant was in the Circle K for a period of time prior 
to the arrival of the police. There was no testimony as to 
what activities defendant was involved in while in the store. 
The Circle K and other convenience stores of its genre 
provide beer for sale to the public. The State's evidence 
failed to exclude the possibility that defendant consumed 
beer while on the premises sufficient to obtain the odor of 
alcohol about his person and to render him intoxicated. 
Indeed/ the arresting officer was so unsure that 
defendant was actually intoxicated that he requested the 
defendant to again perform field sobriety tests at the 
station after defendant has been arrested. (Tr. 97-8/ 108) 
Based on the above discussion/ defendant's arrest was 
without probable cause and defendant's motion to dismiss on 
this basis was improperly denied by the trial court. 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DENIED 
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. 
As the result of the ineffective assistance of his 
counsel at trial/ defendant was denied the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1/ Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. (Addendum 4) The Utah Supreme Court has 
recently held that in order to challenge a conviction on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel/ 
it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that 
his counsel rendered a deficient performance 
in some demonstrable manner/ and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different but for counsel's error. 
State v. Geary/ 707 P.2d 645/ 646 (Utah, 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
An accused in a criminal case has "the right to have 
competent counsel who will take such actions and present 
whatever defenses and interpose whatever objections he can in 
honesty and good conscience justify in the interest of his 
client." State v. Gray/ 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah, 1979) (fn. 
omitted). 
Defense counsel committed several errors in his 
representation of defendant. First/ the prosecutor was 
allowed to lead witness Wilhelm on direct examination 
numerous times concerning facts central to the alleged 
offense. (Tr. 24-8 43-6) The testimony was damaging and the 
manner in which it was elicited served to compound its 
impact. 
Second/ counsel failed to object to witness Wilhelm1s 
lengthy/ extremely prejudicial and irrelevant explanation as 
to why he called the police to report the defendant. (Tr. 
26) Such testimony should have been excluded under Rule 402/ 
Utah Rules of Evidence/ (irrelevant evidence inadmissible) 
and Rule 403 (exclusion of prejudicial evidence). (Addendum 
5) 
Third/ Officer Robnett was permitted to testify without 
objection regarding his conversation with Mr. Wilhelm prior 
to Robnettfs questioning of the defendant. (Tr. 55-56) The 
statements made to Officer Robnett by Mr. Wilhelm were 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and were 
inadmissible hearsay and should not have been admitted into 
evidence. See Rule 802/ Utah Rules of Evidence. (Addendum 
5) The statements served to reinforce Mr. Wilhelm1s 
testimony even though his credibility had not been challenged 
by defendant. 
Fourth/ Officer Robnett testified without objection 
regarding defendant's attempts to take the breathalyzer test 
and was permitted to read from his report form without 
showing that this was necessary due to insufficient 
recollection of the transaction. (Tr. 67-70) Again/ these 
statements were hearsay inadmissible under any of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and should have been excluded 
under Rule 802/ Utah Rules of Evidence. (Addendum 5) 
Fifth/ without adequate foundation/ Officer Robnett was 
permitted to testify to the legal conclusion that defendant 
refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. (Tr. 70) This 
conclusion was inadmissible under Rules 701 and 702/ Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (Addendum 5) 
The first part of the Geary test has been satisfied 
since defendant has demonstrated above that trial counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner. 
As regards the second half of the test/ whether the outcome 
of the trial would probably have been different/ it should be 
pointed out that the evidence against defendant was weak and 
the arrest was not supported by probable cause. None of the 
officers involved ever saw defendant's driving pattern/ nor 
did they ever see him in the car. Mr. Wilhelm did not 
observe any erratic driving behavior either. Since no blood 
alcohol test was taken/ for whatever reason/ the jury had to 
decide if defendant had in fact driven the car and at the 
time of such driving was under the influence of alcohol based 
solely on the witnesses1 testimony as to defendant's 
behavior. Given this reliance on subjective/ personal 
observation rather than an objective test/ the outcome of the 
trail could well have been different if counsel had not 
committed the errors discussed above. "[A] verdict or 
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely 
to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming 
record support." Strickland v. Washington/ 466 U.S. 668/ 
696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Thus/ under the standards of Strickland/ Geary and Gray/ 
defendant has shown he was denied his right to counsel as 
guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully asks the Court to find that the 
errors complained of above require reversal of his conviction 
and remand of this case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of November/ 1986. 
? . Franklin Allred 
t^^o A, 
Margo L.UJames 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
§41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
§41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code 
Information 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §14 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §12 
United States Constitution, Amendments VI, XIV 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rules 401, 402, 403, 701, 702, 802 
Addendum l 
§41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug 
or with high blood alcohol content — Criminal 
punishment — Arrest without warrant — Sus-
pension or revocation of license. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section 
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a 
defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; imprisonment shall 
be for not fewer than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehi-
cle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any 
imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more than one year. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is 
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in subsection (3), the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving in 
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours 
and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in 
addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose a man-
datory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more 
than 720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, 
or require the person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or the work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series 
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its dis-
cretion, order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilita-
tion facility. 
Note: §41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is identical to 
Addendum 1, continued 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second 
conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court 
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work project for not less 
than 240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or proba-
tion until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this 
section or a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compli-
ance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1) may not be terminated and the de-
partment may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a 
result of the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction within 
five years, until the convicted person has furnished evidence satisfac-
tory to the department that all fines and fees, including fees for restitu-
tion and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been 
paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentenc-
ing court to order a convicted person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, ob-
tain, in the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilita-
tion facility, or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabili-
tation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply to a convic-
tion for a violation of § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under 
Subsection (7), so as to require the court to render the same order 
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, 
or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), 
as he would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44 
(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under 
§ 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is 
a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previ-
ous conviction under either § 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior 
conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-
based or other education program provided for in this section shall be 
approved by the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of § 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant 
to Subsection 41-6-43 (b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state 
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not 
there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement 
shall be an offer of proof of the facts which shows whether or not there 
was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the offense. 
Addendum 1 , c o n t i n u e d 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of 
§ 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of violating § 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or 
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, 
the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection 
(5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of 
§ 41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise convicted 
under this section, except that the department may subtract from any sus-
pension period the number of days for which a license was previously sus-
pended under § 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
— 1 A _ 
Aaaenqum y 
1TCF UTAH, DAVIS COUHTt 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
M..11986 
LAYTON CITY, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Billy E. Noon 
810 23rd Street #23 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
DOB: 6/20/56 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
c,e
*. Li^tS^SFc ircuit Court 
Case No. 85TF881 
The undersigned, William D. Robnett, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed, in the 
above-named county, the crime of DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, at the 
vicinity of Antelope Drive, Circle K Lot, Layton, Utah, on or 
about November 30, 1985 at about 9:15 p.m., in violation of 
Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code. 
The acts of defendant constituting the crime were: That 
at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did willfully and 
unlawfully 
operate and/or have actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state while under the influence 
of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered 
the defendant incapable of safely driving said 
vehicle, and/or driving with a blood alcohol content 
of .08% by weight or greater. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witness: William D. Robnett. 
fj/JLJb. 9M 
Complainant 
Subscribed and sworn to beforefmie this 
January, 1986. * 
Circuit /udge 
day of 
Addendum 3 
Utah Constitution, Article I 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to he secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or tilings to be seized. 
Addendum 4 
Utah Constitution, Article I 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Addendum 5 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence.71 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant 
Evidence Inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, 
or by other rules applicable in courts of this State. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of 
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony 
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a 
fact in issue. 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto' in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules. 
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